Archive for the ‘Age Discrimination’ Category

Supreme Court Holds ADA Does Not Apply to Teacher at a Religious School

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

On Wednesday, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the First Amendment precludes the application of the federal employment discrimination laws to religious institutions.  In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, Cheryl Perich, a teacher at a Lutheran Church and School developed narcolepsy and began the first semester of the 2004-2005 school year on disability leave.  When Perich attempted to return to work in January 2005, the principal told her that the school had already contracted with another teacher to fill her position for the remainder of the school year.  The school subsequently terminated Perich.

Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The District Court granted the school’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the ADA claim was barred by the First Amendment.  The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded on the grounds that Perich did not qualify as a minister under the exception.  The Supreme Court reversed.

In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court acknowledged the existence of a ministerial exception grounded in the First Amendment that precludes the application of federal law to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.  The Court reasoned that requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, interferes with the internal governance of the church and therefore the right of the religious group to shape its own faith and mission.

The Hosanna-Tabor Court further determined that the application of the ministerial exception was not limited to the head of a religious congregation.  It refused however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister within the scope of the exception.  Instead, the Court examined the circumstances of Perich’s employment in reaching its determination that she qualified as a minister.  In particular, the Court considered the formal title of “Minister of Religion” given Perich by the church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed for the church.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that Perich’s ADA claim was barred under the ministerial exception of the First Amendment.

The Hosanna-Tabor decision only applies to employment discrimination suits brought on behalf of a minister challenging their termination.  The Court refused to state a view on whether the ministerial exception bars other types of suits such as actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers claiming that “there will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”

Former Partner of a Law Firm Found Not Protected By Federal and State Discrimination Laws

Monday, January 9th, 2012

A New York Supreme Court Justice recently determined that a former partner of Holland and Knight, LLP was not protected by State and federal discrimination laws because he did not qualify as an “employee.”  In Weir v. Holland & Knight, LLP, the former partner claimed that his expulsion from the firm at age 55 constituted age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination Act (ADA) and New York state law.  In rendering its decision, the Court relied on a six part test that was originally created by the Supreme Court in Clackmas Gastroentorology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, to determine whether a shareholder of a professional corporation was an employee for the purposes of the ADA.  The six factors include: examination of whether the individual can be fired, if they report to someone higher within the organization, if and to what extent the individual’s work is supervised, if the individual shares in the profits and losses of the organization, the individual’s ability to influence the organization and whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee.   The Clackmas factors have since been applied by courts to determine whether a partner is an employee under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The Weir Court found that the former partner could not be considered an employee because he could only be expelled from the firm by a vote of at least 70% of the firm’s Directors committee, he had no specifically defined reporting responsibilities and his work was not supervised.  Additionally, the plaintiff’s status as a partner was memorialized in a Partnership agreement and under that agreement he shared in the profits and liabilities of the firm.  Due to these findings, the Court did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s discrimination claims because they were unsupported by any evidence.

Reid v. Google: A Game-Changer?

Friday, August 27th, 2010

California has struck again in Reid v. Google. A simple age discrimination lawsuit involving 54 year-old Brian Reid, Google, and the term “old fuddy-duddy” might have possibly changed the landscape of discrimination lawsuits. Reid sued Google for allegedly firing him because of his age. He claimed his co-workers called him an “old fuddy-duddy” in 2004.

After a six-year legal battle with Google, the California Supreme Court ruled earlier this month that Reid’s lawsuit deserves to go to trial. But more interesting, however, is that the court concluded he could base his claim on what his colleagues call “stray remarks.”

Reid says that, behind his back, coworkers called him “an old man,” “slow,” “lethargic,” and “sluggish.” He also claims coworkers said his compact disc cases should be labeled “LPs” instead of “CDs.”

Courts have traditionally held that such remarks cannot support discrimination complaints. In age discrimination cases, plaintiffs frequently support their claims with evidence of “comments and remarks by managers” or supervisors such as referring to some employees as “old timers.” But when “such comments are made by co-workers” who are not involved in the “decision to terminate the affected employee” or in a context unrelated to the decision, courts brand them as mere “stray remarks” that are not evidence” of discrimination.

The California Supreme Court, however, held in Reid v. Google that such “stray remarks” cannot be “categorically” dismissed from consideration. Instead, the Court explained that, although such remarks may not, alone, be persuasive, they can support a discrimination claim when “combined” with other evidence. When deciding whether to grant or deny summary judgment, courts must “analyze” the, “totality of circumstances.”

Courts do apply the “stray remarks” doctrine on a case-by-case basis, but the Court’s holding here elevates the role of such remarks to a level higher than mere fact-specific analysis. Indeed, when something cannot be “categorically” dismissed, it is forever in play.

The other evidence in this case is fairly intriguing. Reid’s 38-year-old supervisor told him on several occasions that his ideas were “too old to matter.” Google had hired Reid in 2002 when he was 52. “A year later, his performance review said Reid “projected confidence when dealing with fast changing situations,” “had an excellent attitude,” was “very intelligent” and “a terrific problem solver,” and that he “consistently met expectations.” The following year, Google fired Reid because he was allegedly “not a cultural fit.”

Google “culture” is, indeed, rather unique. Census data shows that, in the computer industry in Santa Clara County where Google is located, only nine percent of workers are 50 or older.

Another interesting tidbit: Google fired Reid one year before Google went public, which cost Reid 131,917 stock options that would have been worth tens of millions of dollars.

Whatever the evidence, Reid v. Google should alert employers that, to protect themselves from liability, they must make all reasonable efforts to eliminate all politically incorrect references from the office.